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Abstract— In the most intrusion detection systems (IDS), a 
system tries to learn characteristics of different type of attacks by 
analyzing packets that sent or received in network. These packets 
have a lot of features. But not all of them is required to be 
analyzed to detect that specific type of attack. Detection speed 
and computational cost is another vital matter here, because in 
these types of problems, datasets are very huge regularly. In this 
paper we tried to propose a very simple and fast feature selection 
method to eliminate features with no helpful information on 
them. Result faster learning in process of redundant feature 
omission. We compared our proposed method with three most 
successful similarity based feature selection algorithm including 
Correlation Coefficient, Least Square Regression Error and 
Maximal Information Compression Index. After that we used 
recommended features by each of these algorithms in two 
popular classifiers including: Bayes and KNN classifier to 
measure the quality of the recommendations. Experimental result 
shows that although the proposed method can’t outperform 
evaluated algorithms with high differences in accuracy, but in 
computational cost it has huge superiority over them. 
Keywords; intrusion detection; fast feature selection; 
computational cost; KDD 99. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the time passes the internet breaches more and more in 
human life and merge itself in all aspect it. Despite the benefit 
of internet in making life easier as well as doing varies of 
works faster than ever, it made the whole new ways to do illicit 
behavior. These behaviors vary from infiltration to anything 
that is connected to it illegally to making a resource so busy 
that it can’t service to legitimate users. There are two type of 
defense mechanism against these attacks: static and dynamics. 
Security update and firewalls is some example of static defense 
mechanism. A very popular dynamic defense is Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS). In definition, “intrusion means 
violation of security policy”[1]. With this definition intrusion 
detection express the concept of finding a way to detect any 
illegal behavior that is performing in the network or more 
accurately in transmitting packets. Process of finding these 
illegal activities assume that normal packets are different from 
packets that doing intrusive behavior. Intrusion detection is not 
an alternative to prevention-based techniques (for ex. 
authentication and access control), instead, it is used to 
complete the security measures and recognition of actions that 
tries to bypass the security sections and monitoring of the 
system. There for Intrusion detection stand in the next level of 
security component of the system[1]. In short IDS are used as a 
dynamic methodology to supplement static defense and make it 
more powerful and accurate. An example of these systems is 
represented in figure.1. Some specific examples of intrusions 
that concern system administrators include[2]: 
• “Unauthorized modifications of system files so as to 
facilitate illegal access to either system or user 
information. 
• Unauthorized access or modification of user files or 
information. 
• Unauthorized modifications of tables or other system 
information in network components (e.g. modifications 
of router tables in an internet to deny use of the 
network). 
• Unauthorized use of computing resources (perhaps 
through the creation of unauthorized accounts or 
perhaps through the unauthorized use of existing 
accounts)”. 
Some   of   the   important   features   an   intrusion detection 
system should possess include[1]: 
Figure1. Location of an intrusion detection system (IDS) in a network and utilization of it as second line of 
defense. 
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• “Be fault tolerant and run continually with minimal 
human supervision. The IDS must be able to recover 
from system crashes, either accidental or caused by 
malicious activity. 
• Possess the ability to resist subversion so that an 
attacker cannot disable or modify the IDS easily. 
Furthermore, the IDS must be able to detect any 
modifications forced on the IDS by an attacker. 
• Impose minimal overhead on the system to avoid 
interfering with the normal operation of the system. 
• Be configurable so as to accurately implement the 
security policies of the systems that are being 
monitored. The IDS must be adaptable to changes in 
system and user behavior over time. 
• Be easy to deploy: this can be achieved through 
portability to different architectures and operating 
systems, through simple installation mechanisms, and 
by being easy to use by the operator. 
• Be general enough to detect different types of attacks 
and must not recognize any legitimate activity as an 
attack (false positives). At the same time, the IDS must 
not fail to recognize any real attacks (false negatives)”. 
There are varieties of attacks that IDS tries to detect. Some 
of these can be detected by scanning the packets to find 
signature of specific attacks. Other types of attacks are very 
much like normal packet pattern with slight difference in 
packet content. So there is two type of intrusion detection 
algorithm. They are called Misuse Detection and Anomaly 
Detection respectively. 
A. Anomaly Detection 
Anomaly detection is based on assumption that an attack 
will always similar to normal pattern with a slight difference. 
With this assumption a classifier first trained with normal and 
abnormal samples. It should predict whatever a future coming 
data should be placed in normal class or abnormal class. The 
training process is performed with finding characteristics of 
normal class and definition of rules and heuristics depend on 
observations. A very popular  method for doing this is Support 
Vector Data Description (SVDD)[3]. Experimental result 
shows a very high detection rate and accuracy using SVDD [4-
8]. Another approach is Neural Networks[9-10]. Hybrid 
methods also used to utilize the positive aspects of these two 
approaches while reducing negative aspects of them as much as 
possible. SVDD maximizes the margin but it can’t handle 
missing values correctly. Neural networks have O(1) in 
prediction and ability of handling missing values but it’s not 
obvious what is the optimal weight or how many level is 
required to achieve the best result. An example of hybrid 
method is proposed in [11]. 
B. Misuse detection 
Misuse detection is based on searching for signature of 
known attacks in packets that are transmitted on the network. 
In the other word, misuse detection tries to find intruder who is 
trying to breach in the system using some known attack type. 
Although in real world, system administrators should be 
familiar with all known vulnerability of the system and fix 
them. In this methodology a term intrusion scenario is widely 
used. For any attack to be performed, there are a certain steps 
that an intruder will do to make that attack, these steps is called 
intrusion scenario. Misuse intrusion detection persistently scans 
recent activities and looking for known intrusion scenario to 
ensure no one is trying to attack the system. For intrusion 
detector to be able to detect known attack types, every attack 
should be represented or modeled in specific ways that the 
system can recognize it. This is the point where different 
methodologies for misuse detection are varying[1]. 
 
II. PREPROCESSING AND DATA PROVISION 
A. Preparing Raw Network  Data 
To performing learning process packets from network are 
collected and fed to the learning algorithm. Regularly these 
networks transmits huge amount of data every second. So that, 
datasets for intrusion detection are very populated and 
extensive amount of data should be analyzed. Also packets 
transmitting on the network have a lot of overhead on them that 
is not related to the content of the packet. Because of this a 
preprocessing is performed for raw network data. In the other 
word raw network packets is converted to structures that have 
closer level to meaning of that connection, for example 
connection records. Any of these structures have set of features 
describing them. Deciding which of these features can 
represent more knowledge is a critical decision and one should 
have very wide and accurate knowledge about the domain to do 
that. Because of this, there are not a lot of dataset for intrusion 
detection. As far as the authors know there are only two dataset 
for intrusion detection: KDD 99[12] and IDEval[13], while the 
former is only a refinement version of the later one. 
B. KDD 99 
The KDD 99 is an intrusion detection dataset that is build 
upon about four gigabytes of compressed binary TCP dump 
data from seven weeks of network traffic.  This was processed 
into about five million connection records.  Similarly, the two 
weeks of test data yielded around two million connection 
records. The network was a simulation of military network 
which had three servers with rule of victim computers that 
exposure a lot of attacks and normal network traffic. All attacks 
were consisted on four main categories:   
• Denial of Service (dos): Intruder tries to consume 
server resources as much as possible, so that normal 
users can’t get resources they need.  
• Remote to Local (r2l): Intruder has no legitimate 
access to victim machine but tries to gain access.  
• User to Root (u2r): Intruder has limited privilege 
access to victim machine but tries to get root 
privilege. 
• Probe: Intruder tries to gain some information about 
victim machine. 
The original raw dump network traffic were preprocessed 
for International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools 
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Competition[14]. For this, all the raw data is converted into 
connection. A connection means “a sequence of TCP packets 
starting and ending at some well defined times, between which 
data flows from a source IP address to a target IP address under 
some well defined protocol”[15]. This conversion is performed 
by Paxson algorithm[16]. Result of this algorithm has 41 
features. Each of features is member of these four 
categories[17]: 
• Basic Features: These features are captured from 
packet headers only and without analyzing payload. 
Features 1 to 6 are in this category. 
• Content Features: In this category original tcp packets 
analyzed with assistance of domain knowledge. An 
example of this category is number of "hot" 
indicators. 
• Time-based Traffic Features: for capturing these types 
of features a window of 2 second interval is defined. 
In this interval, some properties of packets is 
measured. For example number of connections to the 
same service as the current connection in the past two 
seconds. 
• Host-based Traffic Features: In this category instead 
of a time based window, a number of connections are 
used for building the window. This category is 
designed so that attacks longer than 2 second can be 
detected. 
The KDD 99 is distributed in three versions which are 
described in table.1. “10% KDD” has 22 attack types and is a 
synopsis version of “Whole KDD” dataset. These datasets has 
more attack samples than normal samples. Because of specific 
attribute of DoS attacks, it has more frequency in dataset than 
other types. In the “Corrected KDD” dataset distribution of 
data is changed also it has more 14 additional attacks. The list 
of subcategories of “10% KDD” is represented in table.2. This 
version of dataset is used for wide variety of studies and more 
importantly it is used in the contest. So for evaluation result, 
we used this version. This version of dataset is used for wide 
variety of studies and more importantly it is used in the contest. 
So for evaluation result, we used this version. Feature values 
for each sample in this dataset have a very unbalanced range in 
compare of other features. For example feature #1 has range 
between 0 and 42448 and feature #10 has range between 0 and 
28. Because of this performing normalization on dataset before 
training phase seems reasonable although this process can be 
done in preprocessing phase too. 
 
TABLE I.  SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION IN EACH TYPE OF KDD 99 DATASET 
VERSION. 
Dataset Packet Category 
DoS Probe U2R R2L Normal 
10% KDD 391458 4107 52 1126 97277 
Corrected KDD 229853 4166 70 16347 60593 
Whole KDD 3883370 41102 52 1126 972780 
 
 
 
TABLE II.  TABLE 1. LIST OF SUBCATEGORIES IN “10% KDD”. 
Attack Number of Samples Category 
smurf  280790 dos 
neptune  107201 dos 
back  2203 dos 
teardrop  979 dos 
pod  264 dos 
land  21 dos 
normal  97277 normal 
satan  1589 probe 
ipsweep  1247 probe 
portsweep  1040 probe 
nmap  231 probe 
warezclient  1020 r2l 
guess_passwd  53 r2l 
warezmaster  20 r2l 
imap  12 r2l 
ftp_write  8 r2l 
multihop  7 r2l 
phf  4 r2l 
spy 2 r2l 
buffer_overflow  30 u2r 
rootkit  10 u2r 
loadmodule  9 u2r 
perl  3 u2r 
 
III. SIMILARITY MEASURES 
In this section we introduce some of most successful 
similarity measures. These successful similarity measures 
includes: Correlation Coefficient[18], Least Square Regression 
Error[19-22] and Maximal Information Compression 
Index[23].  
A. Correlation Coefficient[18]: 
One of the most popular and known measures of similarity 
between two random variable is correlation coefficient. It also 
called cross-correlation coefficient. We can use (1) to measure 
how much random variable ݔ is similar to random variable ݕ. 
ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ ܿ݋ݒሺݔ, ݕሻඥݒܽݎሺݔሻ ൈ ݒܽݎሺݕሻ (1) 
Where ݒܽݎሺݔሻ  correspond to variance of variable ݔ  and 
ܿ݋ݒሺݔ, ݕሻ  correspond to covariance of random variable ݔ 
and ݕ. Covariance of two variables shows strength of relation 
between those variables. If ݔ  grow when ݕ  rises with exact 
linear relation, covariance of these two variable will be ൅1 and 
if ݔ shrink when ݕ rises covariance will be െ1. If two variables 
are unrelated at all covariance will be 0. We can use this as a 
similarity measure. This measure have following 
properties[23]: 
1. 0 ൑ 1 െ |ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ሺݔ, ݕሻ| ൑ 1. 
2. 1 െ |ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ሺݔ, ݕሻ| ൌ 0 If and only if ݔ  and ݕ  are 
linearly related. 
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3. This measure is symmetric. Meaning that 
always ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ሺݕ, ݔሻ. 
4. Assume ݑ ൌ ௫ି௔௖  and ݒ ൌ
௬ି௕
ௗ . For any arbitrary value 
for ܽ, ܾ, ܿ, ݀ we have: 
|ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ሺݔ, ݕሻ| ൌ |ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ሺݑ, ݒሻ| 
5. ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ሺݔ, ݕሻ Is sensitive to rotation of the scatter 
diagram in ሺݔ, ݕሻ plane. 
As Mitra[23]  discussed correlation coefficient have a lot of 
convenient specifications but because of having properties of 4 
and 5 mentioned above it is invariant to scale. Because of this, 
it’s possible that two variables have same similarity measure 
although they have very different variances. It is not preferable 
because variance always gives high information about content. 
B. Least Square Regression Error: 
Another similarity measure that is used regularly is least 
square regression error or residual variance. It is the error of 
predicating ݕ  from  ݕ ൌ ܾݔ ൅ ܽ . Where ܽ  and ܾ  are the 
regression coefficients which can be calculated by minimizing 
݁ሺݔ, ݕሻଶ in (2): 
݁ሺݔ, ݕሻଶ ൌ 1݊ ෍ ݁ሺݔ, ݕሻ௜
ଶ (2) 
Where ݁ሺݔ, ݕሻ௜ can be calculated with (3): 
݁ሺݔ, ݕሻଶ ൌ ݕ௜ െ ܽ െ ܾݔ௜ (3)
So we have (4), (5): 
ܽ ൌ ݕ              (4)
ܾ ൌ ܿ݋ݒሺݔ, ݕሻݒܽݎሺݔሻ  (5) 
Having ܽ and ܾ we can calculate mean square error ݁ሺݔ, ݕሻ by 
(6): 
݁ሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ ݒܽݎሺݕሻ ൈ ሺ1 െ ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ሺݔ, ݕሻଶሻ (6)
With this new measure if ݔ and ݕ have linear relation ݁ሺݔ, ݕሻ 
will be 0  and if ݔ  and ݕ  have no relation at all ݁ሺݔ, ݕሻ  will 
equal to  ݒܽݎሺݔሻ . Mitra also argues about properties of this 
measure[23]: 
1. 0 ൑ ݁ሺݔ, ݕሻ ൑  ݒܽݎሺݕሻ. 
2. ݁ሺݔ, ݕሻ  Is equal to 0 if and only if ݔ  and ݕ  have 
perfect linear relation. 
3. This measure is not symmetric. 
4. Assume ݑ ൌ ௫௖  and ݒ ൌ
௬
ௗ . For any arbitrary value 
for  ܿ, ݀  we have  ݁ሺݔ, ݕሻ  =  ݀ଶ݁ሺݑ, ݒሻ . With this 
property we can conclude that ݁ is sensitive to scaling 
of the variables. It’s obvious that ݁ is not sensitive to 
translation. 
5. ݁ Is sensitive to rotation of scatter diagram in  ݔ െ ݕ 
plane. 
C. Maximal Information Compresseion Index[23]: 
This measure fixed some defects of two previous described 
measures. We refer to it by MICI and use ߣଶ  for simplicity. 
MICI can be calculated using (7): 
ߣଶሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ min ሺ݁݅݃ݒሺ∑ሻሻ (7)
Where ∑ correspond to covariance of ݔ and ݕ and ݁݅݃ݒ is a 
vector of eigen values of that covariance. 
The ߣଶ will equal to 0 when the feature have linear relation 
and as much as the relation fade away, the value of ߣଶ increase. 
As the formula represent ߣଶ  is only an eigenvalue for a 
direction where data have the most elongation. In the other 
word it is the main idea behind Principle Component Analysis 
(PCA)[20, 24]. PCA is based on the fact that if a data be 
projected along its principal component direction, it yields 
maximum information compaction. If we reconstruct the data, 
the amount of lost information is related to eigenvectors that is 
not considered in PCA calculation. In PCA we always use ݇ 
eigenvectors that have maximum corresponding eigenvalues. 
So the amount of lost information will be minimal. The ߣଶ 
have following properties[23]: 
1. 0 ൑ ߣଶሺݔ, ݕሻ ൑ 0.5൫varሺxሻ ൅ varሺyሻ൯. 
2. ߣଶሺݔ, ݕሻ  Will equal to 0 if and only if ݔ  and ݕ  is 
linearly related. 
3. ߣଶሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ ߣଶሺݕ, ݔሻ, so it’s a symmetric measure. 
4. Assume ݑ ൌ ௫௖  and  ݒ ൌ
௬
ௗ . For any arbitrary value 
for ܿ, ݀ we have ߣଶሺݔ, ݕሻ ് ߣଶሺݑ, ݒሻ so it is sensitive 
to scaling and is not related to translation. 
5. ߣଶሺݔ, ݕሻ Is not related to rotation. 
To detect which feature should be removed from dataset 
using discussed similarity measures, a simple general algorithm 
based on K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) algorithm[25] is used. It 
has two phases. In the first phase, all of features partitioned 
using the similarity measure as a distance in KNN algorithm. 
In the second phase a feature that describes its cluster more 
accurately is selected as a candidate of that group. 
 
IV. PROPOSED METHOD 
As discussed earlier, variance of a random variable has very 
high information inside. Intuitively, we used this measure to 
find features with low quality to be eliminated from dataset 
while preserving others. In the other word we used variance to 
discover if any feature has no class dependent information 
included. Features with low information should be removed. 
Also because of nature of intrusion detection datasets, they are 
very populated by samples and even a linear order for 
computational cost is very slow. So we tried to make our 
approach to be simple as possible while preserving its 
accuracy. 
If we look precisely at a simple two class dataset with 
separate classes, we can clearly see that if there is any feature 
in dataset that have separate range of values in each class, we 
can classify all of samples in the dataset with 100% accuracy 
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with a linear classifier. An example of such a situation is 
shown in figure.2. Now let’s assume a more general but still 
simple dataset shown in figure.3. In this dataset it is clearly 
obvious that if we remove any features from dataset, the 
accuracy of classification will not be 100% although the classes 
are separated with high distance. In real world dataset usually 
we have a very mixed dataset but we can still use this fact to 
detect if any feature can have more roles on separation of 
classes than other features. We developed this fact and built our 
algorithm upon it. 
Let ܺ ൌ ሼ࢞௜ሽ௜ୀଵே  be our intrusion detection dataset, 
containing ܰ network connection samples containing all attack 
and normal connections. Each ࢞௜ is a vector with ܦ dimension 
and  ࢞௜ א Թ஽ . Let ܮ ൌ ሼ݈௜ሽ௜ୀଵே  be our class labels for each 
sample. Also we have ݈௜ א ݇  where ݇ ൌ ሼ1, … , ܭሽ. With this 
definition we have ܭ class in our dataset and ܭ ൌ 5 because 
we used “KDD 10%” as our dataset. ࢞௜ௗ Represent the value of 
feature ݀ ൌ ሼ1, … , ܦሽ in connection sample ݅ . For each class 
first we add all data point ࢞௜ which are in same class, feature 
by feature (8): 
ܵ௖ௗ ൌ ቊ݂݋ݎ ݈݈ܽ ࢞௜ ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ ݈௜ ൌ ܿ| 
∑ ࢞௜ௗ
݊௖ ቋ (8) 
Where ݊௖ is number of samples in class ܿ and ܵ௖ௗ is mean 
of connection sample ࢞௜  along feature ݀  whose class is  ܿ 
and ܿ א ݇. We put all ܵ௖ௗ in a vector and call it ܨܵ(9): 
ܵௗ ൌ ሾ ଵܵௗ   ܵଶௗ  … ܵ௄ௗሿ (9)
After that we need to calculate how much ܵௗ  is scattered 
along each feature. In the other word we need to measure 
confusion of  ܵௗ for each feature. For this reason we used 
variance of ܵௗ(10): 
ௗܸ ൌ ܸܽݎሺܵௗሻ ൌ ܧሾሺܵௗ െ ߤௗሻଶሿ (10)
Where ߤௗ  is mean of all values in ܵௗ  and ܸ݀  is variance 
of ܵௗ. Items in ܸ ൌ ሼ ௗܸሽ݀ൌ1ܦ  with high value represent degree 
of turbulence in feature ݀ among all classes. High turbulence 
represents power of corresponding feature in class separation. 
Now we can sort ܸ  with ascending order and select ݐ feature 
index for classification where ݐ is number of desired feature 
that user defined to be selected. 
 
V. EVALUATION 
In this section we used KDD 99 dataset to evaluate these 
three similarity measure and compare them with our proposed 
method. To survey the effectiveness of these feature selection 
algorithm in classification, we used two popular classification 
algorithms including: Bayesian Network Classifier[26-27] and 
K-nearest neighbor classifier[25] and measured their accuracy. 
 
Figure 2.  Demonstration of the fact that we can still classify data with 100% 
accuracy with only one feature when we have separate range of data on that 
feature corresponds to its class. 
 
Figure 3.  Demonstration of the fact that we can’t classify the data with 100% 
accuracy when there is no feature with separate range corresponds to its class.
Evaluation is done with 10-fold algorithm to ensure the 
result is as authentic as possible. So the goal for these feature 
selection algorithm is to keep the class separability of the 
dataset as much as possible while reducing its size to lower 
dimension. Also selection algorithm should be very fast 
because in real world problem we encounter very large datasets 
and slow algorithm is not applicable. 
First of all we classified the original “10% KDD” dataset 
with KNN and Bayes classifiers, result of this process is 
represented in first main column of table.3 and table.4. After 
that, dataset is fed to three discussed methodology also to our 
proposed method. Then the original dataset is reduced to 
features recommended by each of these similarity measure 
based algorithms and FFR (Fast Feature Reduction). At last the 
reduced dataset is again fed to KNN and Bayes classifier and 
result of this classification measured.  
In this research speed of feature selection was our main 
goal. Because of this consumed time of each algorithm with 
different reject threshold measured and shown in table.3. The 
evaluated result for each algorithm is represented in its 
respective column of table.4 and table.5. As evaluation result 
shows, although FFR cannot defeat other methodologies in 
accuracy of classification and accuracy didn’t changed very 
much, but in speed FFR outperformed all other feature 
selection method with great differences. 
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TABLE III.  FEATURE SELECTION CALCULATION TIME IN SECOND. 
  CC (Correlation 
Coefficient) 
LSRE (Least Square Regression 
Error) 
MICI (Maximal Information Compression 
Index) 
FFS (Fast Feature 
Selection) 
Features 
size 
10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30
Speed 0.300 0.308 0.318 1.464 1.473 1.480 1.766 1.778 1.797 0.006 0.008 0.010
TABLE IV.  EVALUATION ACCURACY RESULT OF KNN CLASSIFIER IN PRESENT. 
  All CC LSRE MICI FFS 
Features size 41 10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30
Attack Type Normal 98.20 32.93 96.33 98.65 71.04 98.00 98.00 98.10 97.85 97.85 98.20 98.25 98.30
DoS 98.47 29.09 97.51 98.34 63.67 93.44 98.34 85.20 96.54 98.03 98.28 98.28 98.09
Prob 98.62 55.07 96.41 98.38 75.14 98.98 98.50 98.92 98.23 98.65 98.50 98.42 98.42
R2L 97.88 16.33 90.91 97.03 87.01 97.62 97.43 98.04 98.05 97.80 97.61 97.79 97.61
U2R 82.00 83.33 65.79 76.47 56.00 82.00 82.61 77.55 88.64 90.70 82.00 79.59 79.25
Over all  98.24 32.54 95.55 98.07 71.35 97.09 98.06 94.92 97.66 98.11 98.14 98.11 98.04
 
TABLE V.  EVALUATION ACCURACY RESULT OF BAYES CLASSIFIER IN PRESENT. 
  All CC LSRE MICI FFS 
Features size 41 10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30
Attack Type Normal 56.26 34.30 49.67 70.30 51.60 50.72 58.79 82.94 57.85 57.26 51.52 55.87 53.94
DoS 94.50 NaN 98.71 93.89 32.98 85.08 95.15 30.15 60.67 93.13 61.07 90.97 93.24
Prob 94.92 68.27 92.85 93.73 81.88 92.17 93.71 65.27 78.96 93.81 75.07 89.16 92.74
R2L 91.04 47.14 60.17 63.86 99.65 90.43 91.12 77.21 93.46 87.72 92.22 93.86 95.10
U2R 32.73 33.33 8.33 23.33 2.90 3.90 21.15 3.83 3.93 19.49 8.06 15.03 54.55
Over all  76.09 44.17 69.87 79.29 35.42 55.15 77.22 31.56 55.75 75.73 54.87 71.94 73.91
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